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Abstract 14 
In an experiment, choice-based utility of money is derived from choices under risk, 15 
and choiceless utility from introspective strength-of-preference judgments.  The well-16 
known inconsistencies of risky utility that result if the data are analyzed in terms of 17 
expected utility are resolved if the data are analyzed in terms of prospect theory.  One 18 
consistent cardinal utility index for risky choice then results.  Remarkably, this 19 
cardinal index also agrees well with the choiceless utilities.  This finding suggests a 20 
relation between a choice-based and a choiceless concept.  Such a relation would 21 
imply that introspective judgments can provide useful data for economics, and can 22 
reinforce the revealed-preference paradigm.  Implications for the classical debate on 23 
ordinal versus cardinal utility are discussed. 24 
25 
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1.  Introduction 25 
Utility has been a controversial concept throughout the history of economics, with 26 
interpretations shifting over time.  Since the beginning of the twentieth century, after 27 
what has become known as the ordinal revolution, utility has been taken as an ordinal 28 
concept, based solely on observable choice, in mainstream economics (Pareto 1906).  29 
Ordinalism has dominated economics ever since (Hicks & Allen 1934). 30 
 Based on the many anomalies of observed choice that have been discovered in 31 
the twenthieth century, several authors have argued that a reinterpretation of utility 32 
broader than purely ordinal is relevant for mainstream economics.  One of the earliest 33 
proponents was van Praag (1968), who used subjective questions to measure welfare.  34 
Recently, Kahneman (1994) initiated a stream of papers arguing for the relevance of 35 
experienced utility in economics.  Such a broader reinterpretation was also advocated 36 
by a founder of the Econometric Institute of the Erasmus University, Jan Tinbergen 37 
(1991), who wrote in a special issue of the Journal of Econometrics on the 38 
measurement of utility and welfare: 39 
The author believes in the measurability of welfare (also called 40 
satisfaction or utility).  Measurements have been made in the 41 
United States (D.W. Jorgenson and collaborators), France 42 
(Maurice Allais), and The Netherlands (Bernard M.S. Van Praag 43 
and collaborators).  The Israeli sociologists S. Levy and L. 44 
Guttman have shown that numerous noneconomic variables are 45 
among the determinants of welfare ...   (p. 7). 46 
 This paper presents an investigation into broader interpretations of the utility of 47 
money, using an experimental approach.  We will compare experimental 48 
measurements of choice-based and choiceless utilities, and investigate their relations.  49 
Our main finding will be that there are no systematic differences between the different 50 
measurements.  This finding suggests that choiceless empirical inputs can be useful 51 
for the study and prediction of observable choice.  Let us emphasize that we make this 52 
suggestion only for choiceless empirical inputs that can be firmly related to 53 
observable choice.  These choiceless inputs should reinforce, rather than renounce, the 54 
achievements of the ordinal revolution. 55 
 Expected utility provides a firm basis for rational decisions and for Bayesian 56 
statistics (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, p. 277; Savage 1954; Zellner 1971).  It is also 57 
used as a basis for most descriptive economic measurements of utility today, in which 58 
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risk attitudes are to be captured entirely in terms of utility curvature.  This approach is 59 
so widespread that it has been ingrained in standard economic terminology, with 60 
utility curvature usually described as "risk aversion" or even, in econometric studies, 61 
as "individual preference."  Many empirical studies have, however, revealed 62 
descriptive difficulties of expected utility (Starmer 2000).  Descriptive improvements 63 
have been developed, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky 64 
& Kahneman 1992). Our analysis will first show, in agreement with previous findings 65 
(Herschey & Schoemaker 1985), that utility measurement under expected utility leads 66 
to inconsistencies, which may explain why there haven't been many estimations of 67 
utility yet (Gregory, Lamarche, & Smith 2002, p. 227).  We next show that, by means 68 
of prospect theory, the inconsistencies can be resolved, and a consistent economic 69 
concept of utility can be restored. 70 
  71 
Outline of the Paper 72 
Section 2 briefly describes the history of utility in economics up to 1950, focusing on 73 
the rise of ordinalism and ending with von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) 74 
contribution.  This history was described before by Stigler (1950), Blaug (1962), and 75 
others.  Because of new developments in utility theory during the last decades, an 76 
update of the history is called for.  It is provided in Section 3.  Two developments are 77 
distinguished.  One took place in mainstream economics, where many empirical 78 
problems of revealed preference were discovered, leading Kahneman and others to 79 
propose new interpretations of utility (Subsection 3.1).  The other development took 80 
place in decision theory and concerns the distinction between risky and riskless 81 
cardinal utility (Subsection 3.2).1  These developments will lead to the research 82 
question of this paper. 83 
 Section 4 gives notation and defines expected utility and prospect theory.  Section 84 
5 measures choice-based utilities through a recently introduced method, the tradeoff 85 
method, which is valid under expected utility but, contrary to classical methods, 86 
maintains its validity under prospect theory.  Subsequently, choiceless cardinal utility 87 
is measured without using any choice making or risk.  Remarkably, no significant 88 
differences are found between these two measurements of utility.  A psychological 89 
explanation is given for the plausibility of the equality found.  To verify that tradeoff 90 
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 We use "risky utility" as a shorthand for utility to be used for choices under risk, such as in expected utility.   
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utilities do reflect choice making, Section 6 compares those utilities with utilities 91 
derived from a third, traditional, measurement method, that is also based on choice 92 
making, and that uses certainty equivalents of two-outcome prospects with a 1/3 93 
probability for the best outcome.  Again, no significant differences are found. 94 
 To verify that our design has the statistical power to detect differences, Section 6 95 
also compares the utilities obtained up to that point with utilities derived from a fourth 96 
measurement method, again choice-based and again using certainty equivalents, but 97 
now of two-outcome prospects with a 2/3 probability for the best outcome.  When 98 
analyzed through expected utility, the utilities of the fourth method deviate 99 
significantly from those found through the other three methods, in agreement with the 100 
common findings in the literature (Karmarkar 1978), and falsifying expected utility.  101 
The discrepancy is resolved by reanalyzing the data by means of prospect theory.  102 
This theory does not affect the first three measurements but it modifies the fourth.  103 
After this modification, a complete reconciliation of all measurements obtains, 104 
leading to one utility function consistently measured in four different ways. 105 
 Section 7 acknowledges and discusses some criticisms that can be raised against 106 
our analysis, and compares our findings with other findings in the literature.  107 
Motivations and conclusions are in Section 8.  Appendix A gives the details of our 108 
experimental method for eliciting indifferences, developed to minimize biases.  109 
Appendices B and D describe further statistical tests.   110 
 Appendix C describes parametric families of utility used in our study.  We use 111 
two traditional families but also introduce a new one-parameter family, the 112 
expopower family, constructed from a more general two-parameter family of Saha 113 
(1993).  Our family, contrary to existing families, allows for the simultaneous 114 
fulfillment of three economic desiderata: concave utility, decreasing absolute risk 115 
aversion, and increasing relative risk aversion.  There is much interest in such new 116 
parametric families of utility.  We nevertheless present this material in the appendix 117 
because it is more technical than the rest of this paper.   118 
 In summary, by using prospect theory and the techniques of modern experimental 119 
economics, our paper sheds new light on the measurement, interpretation, and 120 
applicability of utility. 121 
 122 
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2.  The History of Ordinal versus Cardinal Utility up to 1950 123 
The first appearances of utility were in Cramer (1728) and Bernoulli (1738), who 124 
proposed expected utility as a solution to the St. Petersburg paradox.  Utility was 125 
presented as a general index of goodness and the authors did not explicitly restrict its 126 
meaning to risky decisions.  Bentham (1789) gave the first thorough discussion of 127 
utility as a central concept in human behavior.  Risk was not central in his analysis, 128 
although it was mentioned occasionally.  In the century that followed, economists used 129 
utility as an, in modern terms cardinal, index of goodness.  Although there were 130 
concerns about the measurement of utility (Cooter and Rappoport 1984), 131 
measurability was not a central issue.  After the marginal revolution of the 1870s, 132 
which showed the importance of comparisons of utility rather than absolute levels of 133 
utility, diminishing marginal utility became the central hypothesis.  Marshall (1890) 134 
pointed out its equivalence to risk aversion, assuming that the expectation of the 135 
utility in question governs risky decisions.  Table 1 displays the various concepts of 136 
utility, discussed hereafter. 137 
 138 
 139 
 140 
 141 
 142 
 143 
 144 
 145 
 146 
 147 
 148 
 149 
 An important step forward was made at the beginning of the twentieth century, 150 
when the views of utility changed profoundly due to the ordinal revolution.  151 
Economists became concerned about the empirical observability of utility.  Utility was 152 
related to observable choice and all associations with introspective psychological 153 
judgments were abandoned.  This development changed the status of utility from 154 
being ad hoc to being empirically well founded.  Along with the concern for 155 
TABLE 1. Various concepts of utility.  The utilities within boxes are commonly 
required to be restricted to their domains, and not to be applied in other domains. 
 
    
:  A relation between these two is obtained in this paper.  It extends vNM (von 
Neumann-Morgenstern) risky utility beyond risk, and connects an economic, middle-
column, concept with a "non-economic," right-column concept. 
 
Choice-based Choiceless 
ordinal utility Consumer theory 
cardinal utility 
Risk 
Intertemporal 
Welfare 
Strength of preferences 
Experienced (Kahneman) 
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observability came the understanding of Pareto and others that, if the only purpose of 156 
utility is to explain consumer choices, prices, and equilibria, as in the middle cell of 157 
Table 1, then utility is ordinal.  Any strictly increasing transformation can be applied 158 
without affecting the empirical meaning, which implies that utility differences and 159 
marginal utility are not meaningful. 160 
 Alt (1936), Frisch (1926), and others demonstrated that cardinal utility, which 161 
does assign meaning to utility differences, can be formally derived from direct 162 
strength-of-preference judgments, such as the judgment that the strength of preference 163 
of $10 over $0 exceeds that of $110 over $100.  Such judgments are based on 164 
introspection and not on observable choice and are, therefore, considered meaningless 165 
by most economists (Samuelson 1938a; Varian 1993 pp. 57−58).  Hicks and Allen 166 
(1934) strongly argued in favor of an ordinal view of utility, and this became the 167 
dominant viewpoint in economics.  Similar ideas, in agreement with logical 168 
positivism, became popular in psychology, where behaviorism was propagated by 169 
Watson (1913), Skinner (1971), and others. 170 
 New hope for the existence of cardinal utility was raised by von Neumann and 171 
Morgenstern (1944), who derived cardinal utility for decision under risk; earlier 172 
presentations of this idea were given by Ramsey (1931) and Zeuthen (1937).  After 173 
some debates, the consensus became that this risky index is cardinal in the 174 
mathematical sense of being unique up to unit and origin, but not cardinal in the sense 175 
of being the neo-classical index of goodness that emerged at the end of the 19th 176 
century (Friedman and Savage 1948; Baumol 1958 p. 655; Varian 1993).2  Ordinalism 177 
has continued to dominate in mainstream economics ever since. 178 
 179 
3.  Ordinal versus Cardinal Utility after 1950 180 
This section describes the history of utility in the second half of the twentieth century, 181 
which followed after the classic historical review by Stigler (1950) and after von 182 
Neumann and Morgenstern's contribution. 183 
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 For recent deviating viewpoints, see Harsanyi (1978), Loomes and Sugden (1982), Ng (1997), and Rabin (2000, 
footnote 3).  It is remarkable that von Neumann and Morgenstern used their cardinal utility not only to evaluate 
randomized strategies but also as a unit of exchange between players. 
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3.1.  Ordinal Utility in the Economics Literature after 1950 184 
 At the beginning of the ordinal period, promising results were obtained through 185 
preference representations and derivations of equilibria (Houthakker 1950; Samuelson 186 
1938b; Savage 1954; Debreu 1959).  Soon, however, problems arose (Allais 1953; 187 
Ellsberg 1961; Ng 1997 p. 1854; Sen 1974 p. 390; Simon 1955).  Cardinal utilities, at 188 
least in a mathematical sense, could not be discarded entirely.  They were needed, not 189 
only for risky decisions such as for mixed strategies in game theory (von Neumann & 190 
Morgenstern 1944), but also for intertemporal evaluations (Samuelson 1937), for 191 
utilitarian welfare evaluations (Harsanyi 1955), for quality-of-life measurements in 192 
health (Gold et al. 1996), and for (−1 times the) loss functions in Bayesian statistics 193 
(Zellner 1971).  The consensus became that such cardinal indexes are relevant, but 194 
should be restricted to the specific domain where they apply, and should not be equated 195 
to each other or to neo-classical cardinal utility (Samuelson 1937 p. 160). 196 
 The most serious blow for the revealed-preference paradigm may have been the 197 
discovery of preference reversals, entailing that revealed preferences can depend on 198 
economically irrelevant framing aspects even in the simplest choice situations 199 
(Grether and Plott 1979; Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Camerer 1995).  200 
Subsequently, numerous other choice anomalies have been discovered (Kahneman 201 
and Tversky 2000).  It led Kahneman (1994) to argue that choiceless, "experienced," 202 
utility can provide useful information for economics in contexts where such choice 203 
anomalies prevail.  Many other papers have argued for broader interpretations of 204 
utility than purely ordinal, e.g. Broome (1991), Frey and Stutzer (2000), Gilboa and 205 
Schmeidler (2001), Kapteyn (1994), Loomes and Sugden (1982), Rabin (2000 206 
footnote 3), Robson (2001 Section III.D), Tinbergen (1991), van Praag (1968, 1991), 207 
and Weber (1994 p. 239).  A drawback of extending the inputs of utility is, obviously, 208 
that predictions of economic decisions then can become difficult.  The present paper 209 
presents an experimental investigation, based on prospect theory, into broader 210 
interpretations of utility, showing that they can positively contribute to economic 211 
predictions, rather than complicate them. 212 
3.2. Cardinal Utility in Decision Theory after 1950; Risky versus Riskless Utility 213 
 Since the 1970s, several authors in decision theory have conducted empirical 214 
studies into the distinction between von Neumann-Morgenstern ("risky") and neo-215 
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classical cardinal utility.  Contrary to the ordinalists, these authors assumed that 216 
choiceless cardinal utility, and thereby marginal utility, is meaningful, and they 217 
commonly used strength-of-preference judgments to measure it.  As depicted in Table 218 
1, choiceless cardinal utility can also be related to direct experience (Kahneman 1994).  219 
Others have related it to just noticeable differences (Allais 1953; Edgeworth 1881), and 220 
other psychophysical measurements (Breiter et al. 2001).  In this study, we restrict 221 
attention to strength of preferences for measuring choiceless utility.  In decision theory, 222 
such cardinal choiceless utility was usually called riskless utility.  The difference 223 
between marginal riskless utility and risk attitude has often been emphasized (Camerer 224 
1995 p. 619; Ellingsen 1994; Ellsberg 1954; Samuelson 1950 p. 121), and nonlinear 225 
empirical relations between risky and riskless utility have been studied (Bouyssou and 226 
Vansnick 1988; Debreu 1976; Pennings and Smidts 2000). 227 
 The classical decision-theoretic studies invariably assumed expected utility for 228 
analyzing risky decisions.  Under this assumption, a difference between marginal utility 229 
and risk attitude necessarily implies that the corresponding utility functions must be in 230 
different cardinal classes, that is, there must be a nonlinear relation between risky and 231 
riskless utility.  The main problem in this classical approach may have been the 232 
empirical deficiency of expected utility (Camerer 1995).  Different methods for 233 
measuring risky utility, that should yield the same utilities, exhibited systematic 234 
discrepancies (Karmarkar 1978; Hershey and Schoemaker 1985).  These were as 235 
pronounced as the differences between risky and riskless utility (McCord and de 236 
Neufville 1983, p. 295).  It led some authors working on risky versus riskless utility to 237 
abandon the classical expected-utility approach.  For example, Krzysztofowicz and 238 
Koch (1989) and McCord and de Neufville (1984) suggested that nonexpected utility 239 
theories will better accommodate the discrepancies between marginal utility and risk 240 
attitude than nonlinear transformations between risky and riskless utility. 241 
 Since the 1980s, many models that deviate from expected utility have been 242 
proposed (Camerer 1995; Machina 1982, Starmer 2000).  Popular examples are rank-243 
dependent utility (Gilboa 1987; Quiggin 1982; Schmeidler 1989; Yaari 1987) and 244 
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).  Rank-dependent utility and prospect 245 
theory agree on the domain considered in this paper, i.e. two-outcome prospects with 246 
known probabilities.  These theories assume nonadditive probability weighting.  They 247 
provide better empirical predictions than expected utility and explain the 248 
discrepancies between different utility measurements.   249 
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 Several authors have suggested that utility measurement can be improved through 250 
prospect theory (Bayoumi and Redelmeier 2000; Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker 2001; 251 
Krzysztofowicz and Koch 1989).  Before, Fellner (1961 p. 676) suggested the same 252 
basic idea.  Under prospect theory, aspects of risk attitude not captured by marginal 253 
utility can be explained by probability weighting, so that the main reason to distinguish 254 
between risky and riskless utility disappears.  The experimental findings of this paper 255 
will, indeed, find no systematic difference between risky and riskless utility if the data 256 
are analyzed in terms of prospect theory. 257 
 258 
 259 
4.  Expected Utility and Prospect Theory 260 
Throughout this paper, U: — → — denotes a utility function of money that is strictly 261 
increasing.  We examin situations in which U is measurable or cardinal in a 262 
mathematical sense, i.e. U is determined up to unit and origin.  The same symbol U 263 
will be used for utilities measured through strength of preferences as for utilities 264 
measured through risky choices under various theories, even though a priori these 265 
utilities may be different.  The meaning of U will be clear from the context. The 266 
different interpretations of U for strength of preference, expected utility, rank-267 
dependent utility, and prospect theory (where the term value function is often used) 268 
will be discussed in Section 6. 269 
 By (p,x; y) we denote a monetary prospect yielding outcome x with probability p 270 
and outcome y otherwise.  Expected utility (EU) assumes that a utility function U 271 
exists such that the prospect is evaluated by pU(x) + (1−p)U(y). It is well known that 272 
U is cardinal in the mathematical sense of being unique up to unit and origin.3  273 
Prospect theory assumes that probabilities are weighted nonlinearly, by the 274 
probability weighting function, denoted w.  The prospect theory (PT) value of a 275 
prospect (p,x; y) is w(p)U(x) + (1−w(p))U(y), where it is assumed that x ≥ y ≥ 0.  EU 276 
is the special case where w is the identity.  For the prospects considered in this paper, 277 
that only yield gain outcomes, original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 278 
Eq. 2), rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), and their combination, cumulative 279 
                                                 
3
 It need not be cardinal in the sense of being the neo-classical index of goodness that emerged at the end of the 19th 
century (Baumol 1958 p. 655). 
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prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), agree.  Gul's (1991) disappointment 280 
theory also agrees with these theories on our domain of two-outcome prospects, and, 281 
therefore, our conclusions hold under this theory as well.  On the domain considered, 282 
original prospect theory is not subject to the theoretical problems that have been 283 
pointed out for other choices (Handa 1977; Fishburn 1978).  The normalization U(0) 284 
= 0, necessary in prospect theory when loss outcomes are present, is not required in 285 
our domain because it does not affect preferences here.  286 
 Similar to the utility function, the function w is subjective and depends on the 287 
individual, reflecting sensitivity towards probabilities.  Many empirical investigations 288 
have studied the shape of w.  Figure 1 depicts the prevailing shape (Abdellaoui 2000; 289 
Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000; Camerer & Ho 1994; Gonzalez & Wu 1999; Kachelmeier & 290 
Shehata 1992; Karni & Safra 1990; Prelec 1998; Quiggin 1982; Tversky & Kahneman 291 
1992; Yaari 1965).  For counter-evidence, see Birnbaum & Navarrete (1998) and 292 
Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund (2002). 293 
 294 
 295 
 296 
 297 
 298 
 299 
 300 
 301 
 302 
 303 
 304 
 305 
 306 
 307 
 Under expected utility, all risk aversion has to be captured through concave 308 
utility whereas under the descriptively more realistic prospect theory, part of the 309 
observed risk aversion is due to probability weighting.  This suggests that classical 310 
estimations of utility are overly concave.  A theoretical justification for this claim was 311 
provided by Rabin (2000).  Our paper will provide data that supports Rabin’s claims, 312 
and will show that prospect theory can explain these data.    313 
FIGURE 1.  The common weighting function. p 
w 
1 
1 
0 
⅓ 
⅓ 
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 314 
5.  An Experimental Comparison of Choice-Based and Choiceless Utilities 315 
This section presents the first two measurement methods, the, choice-based, tradeoff 316 
method and the, choiceless, strength-of-preference method. 317 
 318 
Participants and Stimuli.  We recruited 50 students from the department of economics 319 
of the Ecole Normale Supérieure of Cachan.  Each participant was paid FF 150 ($1 ≈ 320 
FF 6).  No performance-based payments could be used for reasons discussed in 321 
Section 7.  Each participant was interviewed individually by means of a computer 322 
program, in the presence of the experimenter.  The participants were familiar with 323 
probabilities and expectations but had not received a training in decision theory before 324 
the experiment.  Prior to the experimental questions, the participants were 325 
familiarized with the stimuli through some practice questions.  Three participants 326 
were discarded because they gave erratic answers and apparently did not understand 327 
the instructions; N = 47 participants remained. 328 
 Our choice-based method concerns risky choices.  Only degenerate or two-329 
outcome prospects were used.  They were displayed as pie charts on a computer 330 
screen, where different colors were used to designate different areas; see Appendix A.  331 
The units of payment in the prospects were French Francs.  At the beginning of the 332 
experiment, a random device repeatedly picked random points from the pie charts so 333 
as to familiarize the participants with the representation of probabilities used in this 334 
experiment.  335 
 The measurements of this paper are based on indifferences.  It is well known that 336 
observations of indifferences are prone to many biases, in particular if derived from 337 
direct matching.  Indifferences derived from choices seem to be less prone to biases 338 
(Bostic, Herrnstein, & Luce 1990; Tversky & Kahneman 1992 p. 306).  We 339 
developed software for carefully observing indifferences while avoiding biases.  340 
Appendix A gives details. We assessed three to six points for fitting the utility 341 
functions; using such numbers of points was recommended by von Winterfeldt & 342 
Edwards (1986, p. 254). 343 
 We used a within-subject design, with all measurements carried out for all 344 
individuals. All statistical analyses are based on within-subject differences. The 345 
tradeoff method was always carried out before the other methods because its answers 346 
 12 
served as inputs in further elicitations, so as to simplify the comparisons.  The order 347 
of the other methods was counterbalanced so as to minimize systematic memory 348 
effects, which is especially important for the strength of preference measurements. 349 
 350 
Measurement methods.  For the tradeoff method (TO method), we used “gauge 351 
outcomes” R and r with R = FF 2000 > r = FF 1000.  An outcome t0 was set at FF 5000 352 
(FF 1 ≈ $0.17).  For each participant, the outcome t1 > t0 was assessed such that (⅓,t1; 353 
r) ~ (⅓,t0; R).  Next, t2 > t1 was assessed such that (⅓,t2; r) ~ (⅓,t1; R), …, and, 354 
finally, t6 > t5 was assessed such that (⅓,t6; r) ~ (⅓,t5; R).  Under prospect theory, the 355 
indifferences imply the five equalities U(t6) − U(t5) = ... = U(t1) − U(t0), independently 356 
of how the participant transforms probabilities (Wakker & Deneffe 1996).  Because 357 
EU is a special case of PT with a linear weighting function, the five equalities also 358 
hold under EU.  Setting, as throughout this paper, U(t0) = 0 and U(t6) = 1, we obtain 359 
the following equalities. 360 
 U(ti) =  i6  for all i. (5.1)  361 
The TO observations can be interpreted as direct observations of the inverse utility 362 
function, with ti = Uinv(i/6) for all i.   363 
 Our choiceless method for measuring utility is based on direct strength-of-364 
preference judgments (SP method). For each participant, an amount s2 was assessed 365 
such that the strength of preference between s2 and t1 was judged to be the same as 366 
between t1 and t0, the values obtained from the TO method (for details see Appendix 367 
A).  Similarly, we elicited amounts s3, ..., s6 such that the strength of preference 368 
between si and si−1 was judged to be the same as that between t1 and t0, for all i.  369 
Following Alt (1936) and others, the SP method assumes that strength-of-preference 370 
judgments correspond with utility differences, implying  371 
 U(s6) − U(s5) = … = U(s3) − U(s2) = U(s2) − U(t1) = U(t1) − U(t0). 372 
Using the scaling convention U(t1)−U(t0) = 1/6 (as in Eq. 5.1), we have  373 
 U(si) =  i6  for all i. (5.2)  374 
Note that these strength-of-preference measurements indeed do not involve observed 375 
choices in the sense of revealed preferences (Samuelson 1938a; Varian 1993).  The 376 
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various attempts to relate strength-of-preference judgments to choice making in a 377 
theoretical model after all, through side payments such as hours of labor, repeated or 378 
probabilistic choices, etc., are all based on separability assumptions that beg the 379 
question of cardinal utility.  Strengths of preferences have, therefore, not been part of 380 
the commonly accepted empirical domain under the ordinal view of utility. 381 
 382 
Analysis. In each test in this paper, the null hypothesis H0 assumes identical utility 383 
functions for the various methods.  For testing group averages, we considered paired 384 
t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests, all two-tailed, which always gave the same 385 
results.  Conclusions based on accepted null hypotheses are most convincing under 386 
the most powerful tests, i.e. the t-tests.  Hence, we usually report those.  To reckon 387 
with individual differences, our main conclusions, presented in later sections, will be 388 
based on analysis of variance with repeated measures whenever possible.  These 389 
analyses always give the same conclusions as paired t-tests. 390 
 391 
 392 
 393 
 394 
 395 
 396 
 397 
 398 
 399 
 400 
 401 
 402 
 403 
 404 
 405 
 406 
 407 
 408 
 409 
 410 
FIGURE 2. A choice-based and a choiceless utility function (for mean values). 
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Results.  The mean values of the variables ti and si are depicted in the TO and SP 411 
curves in Figure 2, which were obtained through linear interpolation.  Numerical 412 
details are in Table 1 in Appendix B.  The curves, based on averages, can be 413 
interpreted as the utility functions of a representative agent.  The figure suggests that 414 
the choice-based and choiceless utility curves are the same.  This suggestion is 415 
confirmed by statistical analyses. 416 
 For each j we have sj = tj under H0 because both should then have utility j/6 (Eqs. 417 
5.1 and 5.2).  H0 is rejected for no j, with p-values ranging from .118 to .211.  The 418 
equality is confirmed by parametric fittings, depicted in the upper two panels of 419 
Figure 4 and analyzed in Appendix D. 420 
 Linearity of the TO- and SP utility curves in Figure 2 was tested through 421 
Friedman tests, and was rejected for both TO and SP (H0 for TO: tj−1 − tj is 422 
independent of j, χ5
2
  = 29.6, p < .001; H0 for SP is similar, χ5
2
 = 38.05, p < .001).  It 423 
was also rejected by the parametric analyses in Appendix D. 424 
 425 
Psychological explanation for the equality of choiceless SP utilities and choice-based 426 
TO utilities. Under expected utility, the risky utility function was traditionally 427 
distinguished from riskless concepts because the former should comprise all aspects 428 
of risk attitudes, which obviously play no role for the latter concepts.  Under prospect 429 
theory, aspects of risk attitudes beyond the utility of outcomes can be modeled 430 
through probability weighting (and loss aversion for negative outcomes).  It then 431 
becomes conceivable, at least as an empirical hypothesis to be tested, that the utility 432 
function of prospect theory agrees with riskless concepts.   433 
 From a psychological perspective, it is not surprising that the choice-based and 434 
choiceless utilities measured in this paper agree, because the TO method appeals to a 435 
perception of preference in an indirect manner: In the indifference  (⅓,ti; r) ~ (⅓,ti−1; 436 
R), a perceived strength of preference between ti and ti−1, associated with probability 437 
⅓, offsets the same counterargument of receiving R instead of r, associated with 438 
probability 2/3, for each i.  Because the relevant probabilities are the same for each i, 439 
it is plausible that the perceived strength of preference between ti and ti−1 is the same 440 
for each i (Wakker & Deneffe 1996).  In this way, it is not surprising that the TO and 441 
SP methods gave similar results. 442 
 443 
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6.  Verifying the Validity of Measurements 444 
A pessimistic interpretation of the equality found in the preceding section can be 445 
devised, in agreement with the constructive view of preference (Gregory, 446 
Lichtenstein, & Slovic 1993; Loomes, Starmer, & Sugden 2003): The participants 447 
may simply have used similar heuristics in both methods used, and their TO answers 448 
may not reflect genuine preference.  To investigate this possibility, we used a third, 449 
traditional, method for measuring utility, a certainty-equivalent method.  For the first 450 
13 participants, only TO and SP measurements were conducted.  Then it was realized 451 
that further questions were feasible.  Therefore, for the remaining 34 participants not 452 
only TO and SP measurements, but also two certainty equivalent measurements were 453 
conducted. 454 
 455 
 456 
 457 
 458 
 459 
 460 
 461 
 462 
 463 
 464 
 465 
 466 
 467 
 468 
 469 
 470 
 471 
 472 
 473 
 474 
 Certainty-equivalent methods compare sure amounts of money to two-outcome 475 
prospects and have been used in many studies (von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986).  476 
FIGURE 3.  All utility functions (for mean values). 
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They have a format different than TO and SP methods.  Therefore, if heuristics are 477 
used, it is plausible that they will be different for certainty equivalents than for the TO 478 
and SP methods, and that they will not generate the same utilities.  The third method 479 
considered prospects that assign probability 1/3 to the best outcome.  The reason for 480 
this particular choice of probability will be explained at the end of this section.  The 481 
third method is called the CE1/3 method.  Amounts c2, c1, and c3 were elicited such 482 
that c2 ~ (⅓,t6; t0), c1 ~ (⅓,c2; t0), and c3 ~ (⅓,t6; c2). 483 
 We first analyze this method in the classical manner, i.e., assuming EU.  We will 484 
see later that the following equalities and analysis remain valid under prospect theory.  485 
With U(t0) = 0 and U(t6) = 1, we get: 486 
 U(c2) = 13 , U(c1) = 
1
9 , and U(c3) = 
5
9 . (6.1) 487 
All nonparametric utility curves measured in our experiment, based on group averages 488 
and linear interpolation, are assembled in Figure 3.  Figure 4 gives the average result 489 
of parametric fittings, explained in Appendix C.  The figures suggest that the average 490 
utility function resulting from the CE1/3 observations agrees well with the TO and SP 491 
utility functions.  Analysis of variance with repeated measures for the parametric 492 
fittings confirms the equality of the TO, SP, and CE1/3 measurements while taking 493 
into account differences at the individual level, with F(2, 66) = 0.54, p = 0.58.  The 494 
same conclusion follows from other statistical analyses reported in Appendices B and 495 
D. 496 
 At this point, two concerns can be raised.  First, it may be argued that the 497 
assumption of EU used in the preceding analysis is not descriptively valid.  Second, it 498 
may be conjectured that our design does not have the statistical power to detect 499 
differences (apart from nonlinearity of the utility curves).  To investigate these 500 
concerns, we used a fourth method for measuring utility, another certainty-equivalent 501 
method.  This method considered prospects that assign probability 2/3 to the best 502 
outcome and is, therefore, called the CE2/3 method.  The same 34 individuals 503 
participated as in the CE1/3 method.  Amounts d2, d1, and d3 were elicited such that d2 504 
~ (⅔,t6; t0), d1 ~ (⅔,d2; t0), and d3 ~ (⅔,t6; d2).  We first analyze this method assuming 505 
EU.  With U(t0) = 0 and U(t6) = 1, the following equalities are implied. 506 
 U(d1) = 49, U(d2) = 
2
3, and U(d3) = 
8
9 . (6.2) 507 
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 The average utility function resulting from the CE2/3 observations under EU is 508 
depicted as the CE2/3(EU) curve in Figure 3 for linear interpolation, and in the middle 509 
right panel in Figure 4.  The function strongly deviates from the other curves.  510 
Whereas analysis of variance with repeated measures for the parametric fittings 511 
concluded that the three measurements  (TO, SP, CE1/3) are the same, addition of 512 
CE2/3(EU) leads to the conclusion that the four measurements (TO, SP, CE1/3, 513 
CE2/3(EU)) are not the same, F(3,99) = 6.39, p = 0.001.  That CE2/3(EU) is different 514 
from the other measurements, is confirmed by other statistical analyses, such as 515 
pairwise comparisons, presented in Appendices B and D.  This finding falsifies EU 516 
and agrees with the EU violations documented in the literature. 517 
 We reanalyze the results of the certainty-equivalent methods by means of 518 
prospect theory, and correct the utility measurements for probability weighting.  Such 519 
corrections were suggested before by Fellner (1961, p. 676), Wakker & Stiggelbout 520 
(1995), Stalmeier & Bezembinder (1999), and Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker (2001).  521 
We assume the probability weighting function of Figure 1 for all individuals.  This 522 
assumption obviously is an approximation because in reality the probability weighting 523 
function will depend on the individual.  The descriptive performance of prospect 524 
theory could be improved if information about individual probability weighting were 525 
available.  In the absence of such information, we expect that, on average, PT with the 526 
probability weighting function of Figure 1 will yield better results than EU, which 527 
also assumes that the weighting function is the same for all individuals but, 528 
furthermore, assumes that it is linear.  Let us repeat that the analysis of the TO method 529 
remains valid under PT, irrespective of the individual probability weighting functions.  530 
Therefore, contrary to the CE methods, it is not affected by individual variations in 531 
probability weighting. 532 
 533 
534 
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 566 
 It has been found that, on average, w(⅓) is approximately ⅓ (see Figure 1).  567 
Therefore, our analysis of CE1/3 needs no modification and Eq. 6.1 and the utility 568 
function depicted in Figure 1 remain valid under PT.  Accordingly, the agreement 569 
between the CE1/3 utilities and the TO utilities also remains valid.  It has been found 570 
that w(⅔) is approximately .51 (see the references given at Figure 1). Hence, the 571 
analysis of CE2/3 that was based on EU needs modification.  We now find  572 
 U(d1) = 0.26, U(d2) = 0.51, and U(d3) = 0.76 (6.3) 573 
instead of Eq. 6.2.  The resulting corrected utility curves, denoted CE2/3(PT), are 574 
depicted in Figures 3 and 4.  They agree well with the TO, SP, and CE1/3 curves.  575 
Analysis of variance with repeated measures for the parametric fittings confirms the 576 
equality of the TO, SP, CE1/3, and CE2/3(PT) measurements, with F(3,99) = 0.63, p = 577 
0.6.  In other words, replacing CE2/3(EU) by CE2/3(PT) restores the equality of utility.  578 
The equality is confirmed by other statistical analyses, reported in Appendices B and 579 
D. 580 
 581 
7.  Discussion 582 
 The statistical analyses suggested that the TO, (SP), CE1/3, and CE2/3(PT) utilities 583 
are the same, but that CE2/3(EU) gives different values.  According to PT, the 584 
discrepancy between the CE2/3 utilities, derived under EU, and the other utilities 585 
found, is caused by violations of EU.  After correction for these violations, a 586 
reconciliation of the different risky utility measurements, TO, CE1/3, and CE2/3, 587 
results.  The reconciliation suggests one consistent cardinal index of utility for risk, 588 
supporting the results of the TO measurements indeed.  It entails a positive result 589 
within the revealed-preference paradigm.  The further agreement of this index with 590 
the SP index extends beyond the domain of revealed preference, and is the main 591 
message of this paper. 592 
 The role of real incentives has often been debated, and their importance is now 593 
generally acknowledged (Binmore 1999; Smith 1982). Real incentives are commonly 594 
implemented for moderate amounts of money.  Utility measurement is, however, of 595 
interest only for significant amounts of money, for two reasons.  First, important 596 
decisions typically involve large amounts of money and, second, utility is close to 597 
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linear for moderate amounts so that no measurement is needed there (Marshall 1890; 598 
Rabin 2000; Savage 1954 p. 60).  For these reasons, we had to use significant 599 
amounts and could not implement real incentives. 600 
 Camerer & Hogarth (1999) and Hertwig & Ortmann (2001) surveyed the role of 601 
real incentives.  Real incentives improve performance in cognitively demanding tasks 602 
such as predicting company bond ratings (Camerer & Hogarth 1999, Table 1).  Real 603 
incentives reduce variance and increase general risk aversion but do not affect results 604 
otherwise for simple tasks such as choices between simple prospects, the topic of this 605 
paper.  Kachelmeier & Shehata (1992) confirmed this claim for high stakes.  Some 606 
studies have reported negative effects of real incentives upon intrinsic motivations 607 
(Frey & Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Loewenstein 1999 Section 608 
5).  In summary, because real incentives do not have much impact on choices in the 609 
domain of our study, we have carried out this investigation even though real 610 
incentives could not be implemented.  The utility function for money is central in 611 
economics and its experimental measurement deserves investigation (Stigler 1950 612 
Section IV.c), even if a resort to hypothetical choices cannot be avoided (Shafir, 613 
Diamond, & Tversky 1997, p. 350). 614 
 We used two other utility measurement methods not reported here, an unchained 615 
certainty equivalent method where we elicited values xj equivalent to (j/6,t6; t0), and a 616 
lottery equivalent method (McCord & de Neufville 1986) where we elicited 617 
probabilities qj to give equivalences (qj,tj; t0) ~ (0.75,t6; t0), j = 1,…,5.  The former 618 
method gave the same results as the methods reported in this paper, with utilities 619 
diverging significantly from TO, CE1/3, … etc. under expected utility, but 620 
convergence re-established under prospect theory.  Under the lottery equivalent 621 
method, there was partial divergence from TO etc. under expected utility, but prospect 622 
theory did not improve the case and even enlarged the divergence.  The results of the 623 
lottery equivalent method may be explained by a bias upward due to scale 624 
compatibility that has been found to bias probability matching questions (Bleichrodt 625 
2002).  The data of the two methods discussed here were noisier than those of the 626 
other methods, and these two methods have not been widely used in the literature.  627 
Therefore, we do not report their details.  They are available in Barrios (2003). 628 
 We next compare our findings to existing empirical findings in the literature, 629 
beginning with studies of choice-based utilities.  For this context, there have been 630 
several studies that found results similar to ours.  Karmarkar (1978) and McCord & de 631 
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Neufville (1986) found that utilities, measured through certainty equivalents with 632 
different probabilities, are inconsistent when analyzed by means of EU.  Abdellaoui 633 
(2000) found that the utilities measured by the TO method are not affected by 634 
probability weighting.  Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker (2001) found that corrections by 635 
means of the probability weighting function of Figure 1 reconcile discrepancies 636 
between choice-based utilities.  Tversky & Fox (1995 p. 276) pointed out the 637 
appealing feature of the ⅓ probability that it does not lead to systematic probability 638 
transformations in CE questions.  Finally, Rabin (2000) argued on theoretical grounds 639 
that utility is more linear than commonly thought, and that most of the commonly 640 
observed risk aversion is due to factors other than utility curvature.   641 
 Rabin's argument is based on a paradox entailing that, if risk attitude is based 642 
solely on utility curvature as in expected utility, then a moderate and realistic degree 643 
of risk aversion for moderate stakes necessarily implies an extreme and unrealistic 644 
degree of risk aversion for high stakes.  We used prospect theory, where risk attitude 645 
consists of other factors besides utility curvature, to estimate the utility function.  Our 646 
empirical findings of moderate utility curvature confirm Rabin's predictions.  Our 647 
contribution to Rabin’s paradox is to demonstrate that not only does it refute expected 648 
utility, but also it can be accommodated by prospect theory. 649 
 For the economic literature, the novelty of our study lies in the comparison of 650 
choice-based utilities, derived from prospect theory, with choiceless utilities derived 651 
from strength-of-preference judgments.  The direct agreement between these 652 
measurements (alluded to by Camerer 1995, p. 625) is remarkable.  Our 653 
measurements satisfy Birnbaum & Sutton's (1992) principle of scale convergence, 654 
according to which different ways to measure utility should give the same result.  It 655 
would, indeed, be desirable if one concept of utility could emerge that is relevant for 656 
many contexts, such as decision under risk, welfare evaluations, intertemporal 657 
discounted utility, case-based reasonings (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1995), etc. (cf. 658 
Broome's 1991 index of goodness, or Robson 2001). 659 
 In applied domains, e.g. in health economics, it is common practice to use 660 
utilities measured in one context for applications in other contexts (Gold et al. 1996; 661 
Torrance, Boyle, & Horwood 1982).  For example, risky utilities measured through 662 
the "standard gamble method" have been used in policy decisions about interpersonal 663 
tradeoffs (treating elderly versus young people) or intertemporal decisions (current 664 
prevention measures against future health impairments).  Also choiceless utilities, 665 
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measured through direct scaling questions or otherwise, have been used for decision 666 
making.  The pragmatic justification is that no better data are available, and decisions 667 
have to be taken as good as possible with whatever is available.  Empirical relations 668 
between various utilities have been studied extensively.  See Frey & Stutzer (2000 p. 669 
920), Pennings & Smidts (2000), Revicki & Kaplan (1993), Robinson, Loomes, & 670 
Jones-Lee (2001).  Our improved procedures based on prospect theory provide a new 671 
way of studying such relationships. 672 
 We only compared risky choice-based utilities to riskless choiceless utilities 673 
derived from strengths of preferences, and we did not consider utilities derived from 674 
other tradeoffs such as interpersonal or intertemporal.  We hope that future empirical 675 
studies will consider such other tradeoffs, and that Birnbaum and Broome's scale 676 
convergence can be established with one unified concept of utility relevant to many 677 
domains in social sciences.  Then the use of choiceless data in applications, such as 678 
health economics, can become more acceptable to mainstream economists and 679 
ordinalists, not only for pragmatic reasons (Manski 2004), but also conceptually. 680 
 681 
8.  Conclusion 682 
In the classical economic debate between cardinalists and ordinalists, the latter 683 
assumed that direct judgments, having no preference basis, are not meaningful.  In the 684 
light of today’s advances in experimental methods in economics, the question whether 685 
relations exist between direct judgments and preferences can be investigated 686 
empirically.  The first investigations of such relations were conducted in decision 687 
theory.  These investigations assumed expected utility theory, so that their results 688 
were distorted by the descriptive deficiencies of this theory.  Prospect theory provided 689 
descriptive improvements.  Using this theory, our experiment suggests a simple 690 
relation between direct strength-of-preference judgments and risky-decision utilities. 691 
 If an empirical relationship between direct judgments and preferences can be 692 
firmly established, then direct judgments will provide useful data for economic 693 
analyses in contexts where preferences are hard to measure because of choice 694 
anomalies (Kahneman 1994).  Conversely, such links provide a consistency basis for 695 
direct judgments.  The result will be that direct judgments reinforce the revealed 696 
preference approach and vice versa.  We, therefore, hope for further empirical 697 
investigations of the relations between direct judgments and revealed preferences. 698 
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 699 
Appendix A. A Two-Step Procedure for Eliciting Indifferences 700 
This appendix describes the new two-step procedure that was developed so as to obtain 701 
reliable indifferences.  We first consider the measurement of t1 for the TO method.  That 702 
is, a value x (= t1) was to be found to yield an indifference A = (1/3,5000; 2000) ~ 703 
(1/3,x; 1000) = B.  Figure 5 displays these prospects (called propositions there) for x = 704 
11000.  The first step of our procedure established an interval containing t1.  It started 705 
with x = 5000, which clearly is a lowerbound for t1 because the right prospect B then is 706 
dominated by the left prospect A.  By means of a scrollbar, the experimenter next 707 
increased x to 25000, and here all participants preferred the right prospect B, so that 708 
25000 is an upper bound for t1 for all participants.  These questions, yielding a 709 
preliminary interval [5000, 25000] containing t1, served only to familiarize the subjects 710 
with the choices.  The interval containing t1 that we searched for was to be a narrower 711 
subinterval of [5000, 25000], and was obtained as follows.   712 
 The scrollbar was again placed at its initial value x = 5000, where B is dominated 713 
by A.  The experimenter increased x until the participant was no longer sure that she 714 
prefers A.  Next a smaller outcome x was found for which the participant was still sure 715 
to prefer A to B, say x = a > 5000.  Similarly, an outcome x of B was found for which 716 
the participant was sure to prefer B to A, say x = b < 25000.  Obviously, b > a; if not, 717 
the participant did not understand the procedure and it was repeated.  Thus, an interval 718 
[a, b] was obtained that contained the indifference value t1.  We wanted this interval to 719 
be of the same length for all participants.  Hence, we asked participants to be more 720 
precise if their interval [a, b] was too long.  Commonly it was shorter, in which case the 721 
computer automatically enlarged it.  In this manner, an interval of a fixed length was 722 
obtained for the second step.  Figure 5 displays the final result of Step 1 for a participant 723 
with [a, b] = [7000, 11000] as the interval of fixed length containing t1. 724 
725 
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Choose the preferred proposition (A or B) and click on the corresponding button.  Then 
please confirm your choice. 
*** We are only interested in your preferences. 
**** There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
FF 5000 
ff5000 
FF 2000 
ff5000 
33% 
ff5000 67% 
ff5000 
Proposition A 
FF 9000 
ff5000 
FF 1000 
ff5000 
33% 
ff5000 67% 
ff5000 
Proposition B 
You have chosen Proposition: B Confirm 
FIGURE 6.  Presentation of the prospects in the second step. 
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ff5000 
FF 2000 
ff5000 
33% 
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Proposition A 
FF 11000 
ff5000 
FF 1000 
ff5000 
33% 
ff5000 67% 
ff5000 
Proposition B 
Do you still prefer proposition A? 
FIGURE 5.  A screen used in the first step. 
Do you still prefer proposition B? Change 
Confirm 7000 yes 11000 yes 
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 In Step 2 of our procedure to elicit t1, a choice-based bisection procedure was 756 
used to find the indifference value x = t1 ∈ [α,β]; see Figure 6.  The midpoint (α+β)/2 757 
of the interval of Step 1 was substituted for x, and the participant was asked to choose 758 
between the prospects—indifference was not permitted.  The midpoint was 759 
subsequently combined with the left or right endpoint of the preceding interval, 760 
depending on the preference expressed.  In this manner, a new interval resulted that 761 
contained t1 and that was half as large as the preceding interval.  After five similar 762 
iterations, the interval was sufficiently narrow and its midpoint was taken as t1.  To 763 
test for consistency, we repeated the choice of the third iteration; it was virtually 764 
always (≥ 92% for each measurement) consistent in our experiment.  765 
 766 
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 774 
 775 
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 777 
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 780 
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 782 
 783 
784 
FIGURE 7.  Presentation of strength of preference questions. 
Initial Situation Final Situation 
Change A 
Change B 
FF 5000 FF 6800 
FF 6800 FF 14800 
Which is the most important change (A or B) for you?   
Please confirm your choice. 
*** We are only interested in your preferences. 
**** There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
You have chosen Change: B Confirm 
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 799 
 We adopted the above elaborate method of eliciting indifference values so as to 800 
obtain high-quality data, avoiding many biases that have been known to arise from 801 
direct matching questions (Bostic, Herrnstein, & Luce 1990).  The indifference values 802 
t2,…,t6 were elicited similarly.  For the CE measurements we used the same way to 803 
elicit indifferences as for the TO measurements, now with one option being riskless.  804 
For the strength-of-preference measurements, a similar two-stage procedure was used 805 
but the stimuli were different because no prospects were involved.  Figures 7 and 8 806 
show the screens presented to the participants in the two stages. 807 
 808 
Appendix B. Statistical Analysis of Raw Data 809 
 Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of our measurements.  Paired t-tests of the 810 
equality of TO and SP measurements were described in the main text.  We next 811 
consider paired t-test comparisons of the other two measurements with TO. 812 
 813 
FIGURE 8.  Presentation of strength of preference questions. 
Change 
10800 yes 14800 yes 
Initial Situation Final Situation 
Change A 
Change B 
FF 5000 FF 6800 
FF 6800 FF 14800 
Do you still consider change A to 
be more important? 
Do you still consider change B to 
be more important? 
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TABLE 1.  Mean values in French francs.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 814 
i ti si ci di 
0 5000 (0) 5000 (0)   
1 8048 (1318) 8048 (1318) 7047  (1055) 8976  (1964) 
2 11002  (3022) 11482  (3067) 10011  (2201) 13329  (3754) 
3 14244  (5332) 15076  (4932) 13979  (4214) 18205  (7338) 
4 18023  (7864) 19268  (7275)   
5 22165  (11076) 24210  (10285)   
6 26810  (14777) 30161  (14644)   
 815 
 To compare TO with CE1/3, note that c2 = t2 under H0 because both should have 816 
utility ⅓ (Eqs. 5.1 and 6.1).  Further comparisons between c- and t-values cannot be 817 
made directly because the observations concern different points in the domain.  To 818 
nevertheless obtain comparisons, we use linear interpolations.  (Other parametric 819 
fittings will be the topic of Appendix B.)  Linear interpolation is best done on the 820 
scale with most observations, i.e. the TO scale.  For example, if U(t0) = 0 and U(t1) = 821 
1/6 (Eq. 5.1) then, by linear interpolation, U(⅔t1 + ⅓t0) ≈ 1/9 and ⅔t1 + ⅓t0 can be 822 
compared to c1 (Eq. 5.2).  As indicated in the fourth row of Table 2, ⅔t4 + ⅓t3 can 823 
similarly be compared to c3.  The t33- and p-values in the table indicate that no 824 
equality of the c-values and the corresponding (interpolations of) t-values is rejected 825 
statistically. 826 
 For the comparison of the CE2/3 measurements with TO, note that d2 = t4 under 827 
H0, because both should have utility ⅔ (Eqs. 5.1 and 6.2).  Further comparisons 828 
require linear interpolations, indicated in Table 2.  All equalities between TO- and 829 
CE⅔-values, predicted by EU, are strongly rejected.  If we reanalyze the data through 830 
PT, and adapt the linear interpolations correspondingly as indicated in the table, then 831 
the equality of utility is re-established. 832 
 833 
TABLE 2. Direct tests of the consistency of choice-based methods. 834 
 28 
theory  CEs Utility TOs*
 
t33        p-value 
      EU & PT c1 1/9 ⅔t1+⅓t0   0.09 .928 
EU& PT c2 1/3 t2 −1.49 .146 
EU& PT c3 5/9 ⅓t4+⅔t3 −1.52 .138 
     
 EU d1 4/9 ⅔t3+⅓t2 −5.41 .000 
EU d2 2/3 t4 −4.30 .000 
EU d3 8/9 ⅓t6+⅔t5 −3.96 .000 
   
 
  PT d1 0.26 .58 t2 + .42 t1 −1.45 .158 
PT d2 0.51 .08 t4 + .92 t3 −1.19 .244 
PT d3 0.76 .58 t5 + .42 t4 −1.78 .084 
*: interpolated ti's 835 
 836 
 All tests in this appendix confirm the conclusions based on analysis of variance 837 
with repeated measures, reported in the main text.  Nevertheless, a number of 838 
objections can be raised against the analyses of this appendix.  For the scale that is 839 
interpolated, a bias downward is generated because utility is usually concave and not 840 
linear.  For scales with few observations such as the CE scales, the bias can be big 841 
and, therefore, a direct comparison of CE1/3 and CE2/3 is not well possible.  The latter 842 
problem is aggrevated because the different CE measurements focus on different parts 843 
of the domain. 844 
 The pairwise comparisons of the different points in Table 2 are not independent 845 
because the measurements are chained.  Biases in measurements may propagate.  This 846 
may explain why all five sj values in Table 1 exceed the corresponding tj values, 847 
although the difference is never significant.  The differences can be explained by an 848 
overweighting of t0 and t1, due to their role as anchor outcomes in the SP 849 
measurements.  While distorting the sj's upwards, this bias hardly distorts the elicited 850 
utility curvature.  For the latter, not the values of sj or tj per se, but their equal 851 
spacedness in utility units, is essential.  This equal spacedness is affected only for the 852 
interval [U(t0),U(t1)] under the SP method, which then is somewhat underestimated.  853 
For these reasons, it is preferable to investigate the curvature of utility, as opposed to 854 
the directly observed inverse utility values (this is what our observations ti, si, ci, di, in 855 
fact are).  We investigate the curvature of utility through parametric fittings in the 856 
following appendices. 857 
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 858 
Appendix C.  Fitting Parametric Utility Families 859 
 We fitted a number of parametric families to our data, and used the resulting 860 
parameters in the statistical analyses.  All families hereafter were normalized so as to 861 
be on a same scale, and in this manner their numerical fits were compared.  Because 862 
normalizations do not affect the empirical meaning of cardinal utility, we give non-863 
normalized formulas hereafter as their notation is simpler.  First, we considered the 864 
two families that have been used most frequently in the literature.  Parametric fittings 865 
directly concern the curvature of utility, and smoothen out irregularities in the data.  A 866 
drawback is that the results may depend on the particular parametric families chosen. 867 
 The power family is defined by 868 
• x
r
 if r > 0 869 
• ln(x) if r = 0 870 
• −x
r
 if r < 0. 871 
A rescaling z = x/t6 or x/(t6 − t0) does not affect the preferences and, hence, need not 872 
be applied here. The translation z = x − t0 leads to another family that will be 873 
discussed later.  {#This family is most commonly used in the literature, and is also 874 
knows as the family of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  Our results in Table 1 875 
agree with those commonly found for individual choices with moderate stakes 876 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1992).  In macro-economics and finance, market data are 877 
considered that concern bigger stakes, and then usually lower (more negative) powers 878 
are required to achieve required levels of concavity (Aït-Sahalia & Lo 2000; Bliss & 879 
Panigirtzoglou 2004; Gregory, Lamarche, & Smith 2002; Perraudin & Sorensen 2000; 880 
van Soest, Das, & Gong 2005).  An additional reason why such studies find negative r 881 
is that they assume expected utility so that risk aversion generated by probability 882 
weighting is (mis)modeled through concave utility.#}   883 
 The exponential family, also knows as the family of constant absolute risk 884 
aversion (CARA), is defined by 885 
• erz if r > 0 886 
• z if r = 0 887 
• −erz if r < 0 888 
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where the domain [t0,t6] is mapped into the unit interval through the transformation z 889 
= (x − t0)/(t6 − t0). 890 
 Several authors have suggested that utility is logarithmic (Bernoulli 1738; Savage 891 
1954 p. 94) but this family did not fit our data well.  It allows for concave utility only, 892 
whereas several participants exhibited convexities.  Let us recall here that utility 893 
functions, when corrected for probability weighting, are less concave than traditional 894 
measurements have suggested.  We also considered the translated power family where 895 
x is replaced by x − t0.  This family supported the empirical hypotheses of this paper 896 
equally well.  We do not report its results because this family seems to be of limited 897 
empirical interest: Its derivatives at t0 are extreme and the domain is not easily 898 
extended below t0. 899 
 We introduce a new, third, parametric family, which we call the expo-power 900 
family, and which is defined by 901 
−exp(−z
r
r
) for r≠0;4 902 
−
1
z
   for r = 0. 903 
We rescaled z = xt6 .  Figure 9 depicts some examples. 904 
 The expo-power family is a variation of a two-parameter family introduced by 905 
Saha (1993).  The rescaling z = xt6  maps our domain [t0,t6] to [t0/t6,1] ⊂ [0,1].  On 906 
[0,1], the family exhibits some desirable features.   907 
• r has a clear interpretation, being an anti-index of concavity (the smaller r the 908 
more concave the function is). 909 
• The family allows for both concave (r ≤ 1) and convex (r ≥ 2) functions. 910 
• There exists a subclass of this family (0 ≤ r ≤ 1) that combines a number of 911 
desirable features. 912 
   (i)  The functions are concave; 913 
   (ii) The measure of absolute risk aversion, the Arrow-Pratt measure  −u''(x)/u'(x)  914 
         = (1−r)/x + xr−1, is decreasing in x.   915 
                                                 
4
 For r close to zero, the strategically equivalent function −exp(−z
r
r
+1/r) is more tractable for numerical purposes. 
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   (iii) Finally, the measure of proportional risk aversion, −xu''(x)/u'(x) = 1 − r + xr,  916 
          is increasing in x.5 917 
 918 
 919 
 920 
 921 
 922 
 923 
 924 
 925 
 926 
 927 
 928 
 929 
 930 
Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are considered most relevant in the economics literature 931 
(Arrow 1971 p. 97; Binswanger 1981), but cannot be combined by any of the 932 
traditional parametric families.  To allow for simultaneous satisfaction of all of these 933 
conditions, we developed the above variation of Saha’s family.  Necessarily, a one-934 
parametric family with decreasing absolute risk aversion cannot contain linear 935 
functions and this is a drawback of our family.  For r = 1.3, the curves are close to 936 
linear. 937 
 Other families have been considered in the literature.  Merton (1971) introduced 938 
the HARA family with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion.  This family does not allow 939 
for convex functions, because of which it does not fit our data well.  In addition, it 940 
does not allow for a combination of the three desirable features (i), (ii), and (iii) listed 941 
above. 942 
 Bell (1988) and Farquhar & Nakamura (1987) characterized the family of all 943 
polynomial combinations of exponential functions.  A subclass thereof is the general 944 
sumex family, consisting of all linear combinations of exponential functions and 945 
characterized by Nakamura (1996).  In general, these families have many parameters 946 
                                                 
5
 So as to preserve this feature, we changed only the scale and not the location in the substitution x # z(x). 
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and useful subfamilies remain to be identified.  We did consider one two-parameter 947 
subfamily, being the sum of two exponential functions.  The CE methods have only 948 
three data points, which is insufficient to determine the parameters in any reliable 949 
manner.  The TO and SP methods have more data points and estimations of the two 950 
parameters were obtained.  The null hypothesis of identity of the parameters was not 951 
rejected.  Unfortunately, the parameter estimations were still unreliable and the test 952 
had little power.  Therefore, it is not reported here.   953 
 954 
Appendix D. Further Statistical Analyses of Parametric Estimations 955 
 Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for individual parametric estimates.  Figure 4 956 
in the main text depicts the optimal parametric fittings of the expo-power family for a 957 
representative agent.  The parameters used there are: r = 1.242 for TO, r = 1.128 for 958 
SP, r = 1.206 for CE1/3, r = 0.393 for CE2/3(EU), r = 1.136 for CE2/3(PT).  These 959 
curves are based on averages of t6 and t1/t6,..., t5/t6 for TO, s1/t6,..., and s6/t6 for SP, t6 960 
and c1/t6, c2/t6, c3/t6 for CE1/3, and, finally, t6 and d1/t6, d2/t6, d3/t6  for CE2/3(EU) and 961 
CE2/3(PT).  The curves for power and exponential fittings are very similar. 962 
 963 
TABLE 3 964 
 Parametric Families 
 Power  Exponential  Expo-power 
 Median Mean St. Dev.  Median Mean St. Dev.  Median Mean St. Dev. 
TO 0.77 0.91 0.70  0.28 0.29 0.90  1.29 1.33 0.75 
SP 0.64 1.10 2.04  0.42 −0.14a 2.51  1.12 1.46 2.08 
CE1/3 0.88 1.03 1.23  0.10 0.39 1.73  1.31 1.44 1.21 
CE2/3(EU) −0.33 −0.32 0.97  1.82 2.21 1.86  0.17 0.39 0.56 
CE2/3(PT) 0.77 0.83 1.01  0.23 0.25 1.95  1.30 1.27 0.94 
a
 If one outlier, participant 28, is excluded then the mean parameter is 0.18 and the standard deviation is 1.35. 
 965 
 Wilcoxon tests rejected linear utility for the power family (H0: r = 1), both for TO 966 
(z = −2.24, p < 0.05) and for SP (z = −2.32, p < 0.05), and likewise rejected linearity 967 
for the exponential family (H0: r = 0; TO: z = −2.72, p < 0.05; SP: z = −2.42, p < 968 
0.05).  Because the expo-power family does not contain linear functions, no test of 969 
linearity was carried out for this family. 970 
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 Table 4 presents the results of tests of equalities of utility parameters. The 971 
answers of participant 44 for the CE2/3 questions could not be accommodated by the 972 
exponential family and the parametric fitting did not converge.  This participant is 973 
excluded from the analysis of this family. 974 
 975 
TABLE 4. Results of paired t-tests 976 
Parametric Families 
Power  Exponential  Expo-power 
 
t p  t p  t p 
TO − SP t46=−0.17 .867  t45=−0.63 .532  t46=−0.42 .677 
TO − CE1/3 t33=−0.54 .590  t32=−0.41 .682  t33=−0.67 .511 
TO − CE2/3(EU) t33=6.76 .000  t32=−6.27 .000  t33=6.25 .000 
TO − CE2/3(PT) t33=0.002 .999  t32=0.070 .945  t33=0.23 .820 
SP − CE1/3 t33=0.35 .730  t32=−1.67 .105  t33=0.61 .546 
SP − CE2/3(EU) t33=4.05 .000  t32=−4.76 .000  t33=2.98 .005 
SP − CE2/3(PT) t33=0.69 .493  t32=−1.16 .255  t33=0.91 .368 
CE1/3 − CE2/3(EU) t33=5.23 .000  t32=−7.19 .000  t33=5.27 .000 
CE1/3 − CE2/3(PT) t33=0.57 .572  t32=0.43 .672  t33=0.91 .370 
CE2/3(EU)− CE2/3(PT) t33=−13.34 .000  t32=10.09 .000  t33=−8.13 .000 
 977 
The conclusions are the same for all families and agree with the conclusions in the 978 
main text. The CE2/3 measurements, when analyzed through EU, differ significantly 979 
from all the other measurements. The other measurements, including the CE2/3 980 
measurements when analyzed through PT, agree.   981 
 The statistics for analyses of variance with repeated measures described in the 982 
main text concerned the expo-power family.  The other families give very similar 983 
statistics and the same conclusions. 984 
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